May 18

DIOGENES used to say, "Ever since Antisthenes made me free, I have ceased to be a slave." How did he make him free? Hear what he says. “He taught me what was my own, and what not. An estate is not my own. Kindred, domestics, friends, reputation, familiar places, manner of life, all belong to another."

"What is your own, then?"

"The use of the appearances of things. He showed me that I have this, not subject to restraint or compulsion; no one can hinder or force me to use them any otherwise than I please. Who, then, after this, hath any power over me? Philip, or Alexander, or Perdiccas, or the Persian king? Whence should they have it? For he that is to be subdued by man must, long before, be subdued by things. He, therefore, of whom neither pleasure nor pain, nor fame nor riches, can get the better, and who is able, whenever he thinks fit, to throw away his whole body with contempt, and depart, whose slave can he ever be?"

EPICTETUS. DISCOURSES. Book iii. 23, 4.

May 17

PRISCUS HELVIDIUS, when Vespasian had sent to forbid his going to the senate, answered, "It is in your power to prevent my continuing a senator; but while I am one, I must go." "Well then, at least be silent there."—" Do not ask my opinion, and I will be silent."—"But I must ask it."—" And I must speak what appears to me to be right."—"But if you do, I will put you to death."—" Did I ever tell you that I was immortal? You will do your part, and I mine: It is yours to kill, and mine to die intrepid; yours to banish me, mine to depart untroubled."

What good, then, did Priscus do, who was but a single person? Why what good does the purple do to the garment? What but the being a shining character in himself, and setting a good example to others? Another, perhaps, if in such circumstances Caesar had forbidden his going to the senate, would have answered, “I am obliged to you for excusing me." But such a one he would not have forbidden to go, well knowing that he would either sit like a statue, or, if he spoke, he would say what he knew to be agreeable to Caesar, and would overdo it by adding still more.

EPICTETUS. DISCOURSES. Book i. 2, 4, 5.

May 16

I WOULD be the purple, that small and shining thing, which gives a lustre and beauty to the rest.

EPICTETUS. DISCOURSES. Book i. 2, 3.

FOR as for him who is the Administrator of all, he will make good use of thee whether thou wilt or no, and make thee (as a part and member of the whole) so to co-operate with him, that whatsoever thou doest, shall turn to the furtherance of his own counsels, and resolutions. But be not thou for shame such a part of the whole, as that vile and ridiculous verse (which Chrysippus in a place doth mention) is a part of the Comedy.

MARCUS AURELIUS. MEDITATIONS. Book vi. 37.

PAY in, before you are called upon, what is due to the public, and you will never be asked for what is not due.

EPICTETUS. FRAGMENTS. 72.

May 15

IS freedom anything else than the power of living as we like?

Nothing else.

Well tell me, then, do you like to live in error?

We do not. No one, sure, that lives in error is free.

Do you like to live in fear? Do you like to live in sorrow? Do you like to live in perturbation?

By no means.

No one, therefore, in a state of fear, or sorrow, or perturbation, is free; but whoever is delivered from sorrow, fear, and perturbation, by the same means is delivered likewise from slavery.

EPICTETUS. DISCOURSES. Book ii. §I, ¶4.

May 14

WHO is it that hath fitted the sword to the scabbard, and the scabbard to the sword? Is it no one? From the very construction of a complete work, we are used to declare positively, that it must be the operation of some artificer, and not the effect of mere chance. Doth every such work, then, demonstrate an artificer; and do not visible objects, and the sense of seeing, and Light, demonstrate one?

EPICTETUS. DISCOURSES. Book i. §6, ¶2.

SEE the practice of those who play skilfully at ball. No one contends for the ball, as either a good or an evil; but how he may throw and catch it again. Here lies the address, here the art, the nimbleness, the sagacity; that I may not be able to catch it, even if I hold up my lap for it; another may catch it whenever I throw it. But if we catch or throw it with fear or perturbation, what kind of play will this be? How shall we keep ourselves steady; or how see the order of the game? One will say, Throw; another, Do not throw; a third, You have thrown once already. This is a mere quarrel, not a play.

E. D. ii. 5, 3.

May 13

REMEMBER that you must behave in life as at an entertainment. Is anything brought round to you? Put out your hand and take your share with moderation. Doth it pass by you? Do not stop it. Is it not yet come? Do not stretch forth your desire towards it, but wait till it reaches you.

EPICTETUS. MANUAL. 15.

LET death and exile, and all other things which appear terrible, be daily before your eyes, but chiefly death, and you will never entertain any abject thought, nor too eagerly covet anything.

E. M. 21.

AT a feast, to choose the largest share is very suitable to the bodily appetite, but utterly inconsistent with the social spirit of an entertainment. When you eat with another, then, remember not only the value of those things which are set before you to the body, but the value of that behaviour which ought to be observed towards the person who gives the entertainment.

E. M. 36.

May 12

IF you would have your house securely inhabited, imitate the Spartan Lycurgus. And as he did not enclose his city with walls, but fortified the inhabitants with virtue, and preserved the city always free, so you do likewise; not surround yourself with a great courtyard, nor raise high towers, but strengthen those that live with you by benevolence and fidelity and friendship. And thus nothing hurtful will enter, even if the whole band of wickedness was set in array against it.

EPICTETUS. FRAGMENTS. 40.

THERE is nothing more shameful than perfidious friendship.

MARCUS AURELIUS. MEDITATIONS. Book xi. 7.

HE is the master of every other person who is able to confer or remove whatever that person wishes to have or to avoid. Whoever then would be free, let him wish nothing, let him decline nothing, which depends on others, else he must necessarily be a slave.

EPICTETUS. MANUAL. 14.