Wednesday

August 31

BY placing over against you the imitation of great and good men, you will conquer any appearance, and not be drawn away by it. But, in the first place, be not hurried along with it, by its hasty vehemence: but say, Appearance, wait for me a little. Let me see what you are, and what you represent. Let me try you. Then, afterwards, do not suffer it to go on drawing gay pictures of what will follow : if you do, it will lead you wherever it pleases. But rather oppose to it some good and noble appearance, and banish this base and sordid one. If you are habituated to this kind of exercise, you will see what shoulders, what nerves, what sinews, you will have. But now it is mere trifling talk, and nothing more. He is the true practitioner who exercises himself against such appearances as these.

EPICTETUS. DISCOURSES. Book ii. §18, ¶5.

Tuesday

August 30

WILL you say that there is nothing independent which is in your own power alone, and unalienable? See, then, if you have anything of this sort. — "I do not know." But, consider it thus: Can anyone make you assent to a falsehood? — "No one." In the topic of assent, then, you are unrestrained and unhindered. — "Agreed." Well, and can anyone compel you to exert your pursuits towards what you do not like ? — "He can. For when he threatens me with death, or fetters, he compels me to exert them." If, then, you were to despise dying, or being fettered, would you any longer regard him? — "No." Is despising death, then, an action in our power, or is it not? — "It is." Is it, therefore, in your power also to exert your pursuits towards anything, or is it not? — "Agreed that it is. But in whose power is my avoiding anything?" This too, is in your own. — "What then, if, when I am exerting myself to walk, anyone should restrain me?" What part of you can he restrain? Can he restrain your assent? — "No, but my body." Ay, as he may a stone. — "Be it so. But still I walk no more." And who told you that walking was an action of your own that cannot be restrained? For I only said that your exerting yourself towards it could not be restrained.

EPICTETUS. DISCOURSES. Book iv. §1, ¶11.

Monday

August 29

APPEARANCES to the mind are of four kinds. Things either are what they appear to be; or they neither are, nor appear to be; or they are, and do not appear to be; or they are not, and yet appear to be. To form a right judgment in all these cases, belongs only to the completely instructed.

EPICTETUS. DISCOURSES. Book i. §27, ¶1.

AGAINST specious appearances we must have clear preconceptions brightened up and ready. When death appears as an evil, we ought immediately to remember that evils may be avoided, but death is necessity.

EPICTETUS. DISCOURSES. Book i. §27, ¶1.

WHAT is the cause of assent to anything? Its appearing to be true. It is not possible then, to assent to what appears to be not true. Why? Because it is the very nature of the understanding to agree to truth, to be dissatisfied with falsehood, and to suspend its belief in doubtful cases. What is the proof of this? Persuade yourself if you can, that it is now night. Impossible. Unpersuade yourself that it is day. Impossible. When anyone then assents to what is false, be assured that he doth not wilfully assent to it as false; but what is false appears to him to be true.

EPICTETUS. DISCOURSES. Book i. §28, ¶1.

Sunday

August 28

I, TOO the other day had an iron lamp burning before my household deities. Hearing a noise at the window, I ran. I found my lamp was stolen. I considered, that he who took it away did nothing unaccountable. What then? Tomorrow, says I, you shall find an earthen one; for a man loses only what he hath. I have lost my coat. Ay, because you had a coat. I have a pain in my head. Why, can you have a pain in your horns? Why, then, are you out of humour? For loss and pain can be only of such things as are possessed.

EPICTETUS. DISCOURSES. Book i. §18. ¶1.

THOU seest that those things, which for a man to hold on in a prosperous course, and to live a divine life, are requisite and necessary, are not many, for the gods will require no more of any man, that shall but keep and observe these things.

MARCUS AURELIUS. MEDITATIONS. Book ii. 2.

Saturday

August 27

THE will of nature may be learned from those things in which we do not differ from each other. As, when our neighbour's boy hath broken a cup, or the like, we are presently ready to say, "These are things that will happen." Be assured, then, that when your own cup likewise is broken, you ought to be affected just as when another's cup was broken. Transfer this, in like manner, to greater things. Is the child or wife of another dead? There is no one who would not say, "This is an accident common to man." But if anyone's own child happens to die, it is presently, "Alas! how wretched am I!" But it should be remembered how we are affected in hearing the same thing concerning others.

EPICTETUS. MANUAL. 26.

Friday

August 26

A LIFE entangled with fortune resembles a wintry torrent; for it is turbulent, and muddy, and difficult to pass, and violent, and noisy, and of shorter continuance.

A soul conversant with virtue resembles a perpetual fountain; for it is clear, and gentle, and potable, and sweet, and communicative, and rich, and harmless, and innocent.

EPICTETUS. FRAGMENTS. 1.

THOU must be like a promontory of the sea, against which though the waves bear continually, yet it both itself stands, and about it are those swelling waves stilled and quieted.

MARCUS AURELIUS. MEDITATIONS. Book iv. 40.

UNSPOTTED by pleasure, undaunted by pain; free from any manner of wrong, or contumely, by himself offered unto himself: not capable of any evil from others: a wrestler of the best sort, and for the highest prize.

MARCUS AURELIUS. MEDITATIONS. Book iii. 4.

Thursday

August 25

YOU will commit the fewest faults in judging, if you are faultless in your own life.

EPICTETUS. FRAGMENTS. 57.

USE thyself, as often as thou seest any man do anything, presently if it be possible to say unto thyself. What is this man's end in this his action? But begin this course with thyself first of all, and diligently examine thyself concerning whatsoever thou doest.

MARCUS AURELIUS. MEDITATIONS. Book x. 37.

PIERCE and penetrate into the estate of everyone's understanding that thou hast to do with: as also make the estate of thine own open, and penetrable to any other.

MARCUS AURELIUS. MEDITATIONS. Book viii. 58.

Wednesday

August 24

HEALTH is a good, sickness an evil. No, sir. But what? A right use of health is good, a wrong one evil. So that in truth it is possible to be a gainer even by sickness.

EPICTETUS. DISCOURSES. Book iii. §20. ¶1.

AS one who had lived, and were now to die by right, whatsoever is yet remaining, bestow that wholly as a gracious overplus upon a virtuous life. Love and affect that only, whatsoever it be that happeneth, and is by the Fates appointed unto thee. For what can be more reasonable? And as anything doth happen unto thee by way of cross, or calamity, call to mind presently and set before thine eyes, the examples of some other men, to whom the selfsame thing did once happen likewise. Well, what did they? They grieved; they wondered; they complained. And where are they now?

MARCUS AURELIUS. MEDITATIONS. Book vii. 31.

Tuesday

August 23

THE form of the Athenians' prayer did run thus; "O rain, rain good Jupiter, upon all the grounds and fields that belong to the Athenians." Either we should not pray at all, or thus absolutely and freely; and not everyone for himself in particular alone.

MARCUS AURELIUS. MEDITATIONS. Book v. 7.

A MAN should come to sacrifices and prayers, previously purified. But you, when you have got the words by heart, say, "These words are sacred of themselves."

EPICTETUS. DISCOURSES. Book iii. §21. ¶1.

TAKE me and throw me where thou wilt: I am indifferent. For there also I shall have that Spirit which is within me propitious; that is well pleased and fully contented both in that constant disposition, and with those particular actions, which to its own proper constitution are suitable and agreeable.

MARCUS AURELIUS. MEDITATIONS. Book viii. 43.

August 23

THE true philosopher, unless prevented, will serve the state.

ZENO. in SENECA'S DIALOGUES. Book viii. 3. 2.

THOSE in charge of public business should look at the advantage of the citizens, and follow that in all they do, forgetting themselves. Such a trust should be administered in the interest of those who give it, not that of him to who it is given.

PANAETIUS. in CICERO'S de OFFICIIS. Book i. 17. 12.

Monday

August 22

HE who frequently converses with others, either in discourse or entertainments, or in any familiar way of living, must necessarily either become like his companions, or bring them over to his own way. For, if a dead coal be applied to a live one, either the first will quench the last, or the last kindle the first. Since, then, the danger is so great, caution must be used in entering into these familiarities with the vulgar; remembering that it is impossible to touch a chimney-sweeper without being partaker of his soot.

EPICTETUS. DISCOURSES. Book iii. §16. ¶1

IT is not thine, but another man's sin. Why should it trouble thee? Let him look to it, whose sin it is.

MARCUS AURELIUS. MEDITATIONS. ix. 18.

CHOOSE the best life; for custom will make it pleasant.

Attributed to EPICTETUS.

Sunday

August 21

SUCH is the present case. Because by speech and verbal precepts we are to arrive at perfection, and purify our own choice, and rectify that faculty, of which the office is, the use of the appearances of things; and because for the delivery of theorems a certain manner of expression, and some variety and subtlety of discourse, becomes necessary; many, captivated by these very things one by expression, another by syllogisms, a third by convertible propositions, just as our traveller was by the good inn—go no further, but sit down and waste their lives shamefully there, as if amongst the sirens. Your business, man, was to prepare yourself for such an use of the appearances of things as nature demands : not to be frustrated of your desires, or incur your aversions; never to be disappointed or unfortunate, but free, unrestrained, uncompelled; conformed to the administration of Jupiter, obedient to that, finding fault with nothing, but able to say from your whole soul the verses which begin,

Conduct me, Jove; and thou, O Destiny.

EPICTETUS. DISCOURSES. Book iii. §23. ¶4.

Saturday

August 20

IF you would give a just sentence, mind neither parties nor pleaders, but the cause itself.

EPICTETUS. FRAGMENTS. 56.

THESE two rules, thou must have always in a readiness. First do nothing at all, but what Reason proceeding from the regal and supreme part, shall for the good and benefit of men, suggest unto thee. And secondly, if any man that is present, shall be able to rectify thee or to turn thee from some erroneous persuasion, that thou be always ready to change thy mind, and this change to proceed, not from any respect of any pleasure or credit thereon depending, but always from some probable apparent ground of justice, or of some public good thereby to be furthered; or from some other such inducement.

MARCUS AURELIUS. MEDITATIONS. Book iv. 10.

Friday

August 18

IF anyone opposes very evident truths, it is not easy to find a reason which may persuade him to alter his opinion. This arises neither from his own strength, nor from the weakness of his teacher: but when, after being driven upon an absurdity, he becomes petrified, how shall we deal with him any longer by reason?

Now there are two sorts of petrifaction: the one, a petrifaction of the understanding; the other, of the sense of shame, when a person hath obstinately set himself not to assent to evident truths, nor to quit the defence of contradictions. We all dread a bodily mortification; and would make use of every contrivance to avoid it: but none of us is troubled about a mortification of the soul. And yet, indeed, even with regard to the soul, when a person is so affected as not to apprehend or understand anything, we think him in a sad condition: but where the sense of shame and modesty is under an absolute mortification, we go so far as even to call this, strength of mind.

EPICTETUS. DISCOURSES. Book i. §5. ¶¶1, 2.

August 19

DELIBERATE much before you say and do anything; for, it will not be in your power to recall what is said or done.

EPICTETUS. FRAGMENTS. 96.

REMEMBER, that to change thy mind upon occasion, and to follow him that is able to rectify thee, is equally ingenuous, as to find out at the first, what is right and just, without help. For of thee nothing is required, that is beyond the extent of thine own deliberation and judgment, and of thine own understanding.

MARCUS AURELIUS. MEDITATIONS. Book viii. 14.

SOLON, when he was silent at an entertainment, being asked by Periander whether he was silent for want of words, or from folly: "No fool," answered he, "can be silent at a feast."

EPICTETUS. FRAGMENTS. 71.

Thursday

August 18

MEN do not suffer anyone to seize their estates, and they rush to stones and arms if there is even the slightest dispute about the limit of their lands, yet they allow others to trespass upon their life -nay, they themselves even lead in those who will eventually possess it. No one is to be found who is willing to distribute his money, yet among how many does each one of us distribute his life! In guarding their fortune men are often closefisted, yet, when it comes to the matter of wasting time, in the case of the one thing in which it is right to be miserly, they show themselves most prodigal.

SENECA. ON THE SHORTNESS OF LIFE. Ch. ii. 1-2.

Wednesday

August 17

SUCH there be, who when they have done a good turn to any, are ready to set them on the score for it, and to require retaliation. Others there be, who though they stand not upon retaliation, to require any, yet they think with themselves nevertheless, that such a one is their debtor, and they know (as their word is) what they have done. Others again there be, who when they have done any such thing, do not so much as know what they have done; but are like unto the vine, which beareth her grapes, and when once she hath borne her own proper fruit, is contented and seeks for no further recompense. As a horse after a race, and a hunting dog when he hath hunted, and a bee when she hath made her honey, look not for applause and commendation; so neither doth that man that rightly doth understand his own nature when he hath done a good turn: but from one doth proceed to do another, even as the vine after she hath once borne fruit in her own proper season, is ready for another time. Thou therefore must be one of them, who what they do, barely do it without any further thought, and are in a manner insensible of what they do.

MARCUS AURELIUS. MEDITATIONS. Book v. 6.

Tuesday

August 16

IF anybody shall reprove me, and shall make it apparent unto me, that in any either opinion or action of mine I do err, I will most gladly retract. For it is the truth that I seek after, by which I am sure that never any man was hurt; and as sure, that he is hurt that continues in any error, or ignorance whatsoever.

MARCUS AURELIUS. MEDITATIONS. Book vi. 60.

TEACH them that sin better, and make it appear unto them: but be not angry with them.

MARCUS AURELIUS. MEDITATIONS. Book vi. 25.

WHEN you have done well, and another is benefited by your action, must you like a very fool look for a third thing besides, as that it may appear unto others also that you have done well, or that you may in time, receive one good turn for another?

MARCUS AURELIUS. MEDITATIONS. Book vii. 43.

Monday

August 15

IT is better, by yielding to truth, to conquer opinion; than, by yielding to opinion, to be defeated by truth.

EPICTETUS. FRAGMENTS. 34.

IF you seek truth you will not seek to conquer by ail possible means; and when you have found truth, you will have a security against being conquered.

EPICTETUS. FRAGMENTS. 35.

TRUTH conquers by itself, opinions by foreign aids.

EPICTETUS. FRAGMENTS. 36.

THE soul resembles a vessel filled with water: the appearances of things resemble a ray falling upon its surface. If the water is moved, the ray will seem to be moved likewise, though it is in reality without motion. Whenever, therefore, anyone is seized with a swimming in his head, it is not the arts and virtues that are confounded, but the mind in which they are: and, if this recover its composure, so will they likewise.

EPICTETUS. DISCOURSES. Book iii. §3. ¶6.

Sunday

August 14

GOVERN us like reasonable creatures. Show us what is for our interest, and we will pursue it; show us what is against our interest, and we will avoid it. Like Socrates, make us imitators of yourself. He was properly a governor of men, who subjected their desires and aversions, their pursuits, their avoidances, to himself. "Do this; do not do that, or I will throw you into prison." Going thus far only is not governing men like reasonable creatures. But — "Do as Zeus hath commanded, or you will be punished. You will be a loser."

What shall I lose?

Nothing more than the not doing what you ought. You will lose your fidelity, honour, decency. Look for no greater losses than these.

EPICTETUS. DISCOURSES. Book iii. §7. ¶2.

Saturday

August 13

IS there not a divine and powerful and inevitable law which exacts the greatest punishments from those who are guilty of the greatest offences? For what says this law? Let him who claims what doth not belong to him be arrogant, be vainglorious, be base, be a slave; let him grieve, let him envy, let him pity; and, in a word, let him be unhappy, let him lament.

EPICTETUS. DISCOURSES. Book iii. §24. ¶4.

HE that sinneth, sinneth unto himself. He that is unjust, hurts himself, in that he makes himself worse than he was before. Not he only that committeth, but he also that omitteth something, is oftentimes unjust.

MARCUS AURELIUS. MEDITATIONS. Book ix. 4.

Friday

August 12

CHASTISE your passions, that they may not punish you.

EPICTETUS. FRAGMENTS. 4.

THERE are some punishments appointed, as by a law, for such as disobey the divine administration. Whoever shall esteem anything good, except what depends on choice, let him envy, let him covet, let him flatter, let him be full of perturbation. Whoever esteems anything else to be evil, let him grieve, let him mourn, let him lament, let him be wretched. And yet, though thus severely punished, we cannot desist.

EPICTETUS. DISCOURSES. Book iii. §11. ¶1.

WHENSOEVER thou findest thyself, that thou art in danger of a relapse, and that thou art not able to master and overcome those difficulties and temptations that present themselves in thy present station: get thee into any private corner, where thou mayest be better able. Or if that will not serve, forsake even thy life rather. But so that it be not in passion, but in a plain voluntary modest way: this being the only commendable action of thy whole life, that thus thou art departed, or this having been the main work and business of thy whole life, that thou mightest thus depart.

MARCUS AURELIUS. MEDITATIONS. Book x. 5.

Thursday

August 11

ONE prayeth how he may be rid of such a one: pray thou that thou mayest so patiently bear with him, as that thou have no such need to be rid of him.

MARCUS AURELIUS. MEDITATIONS. Book ix. 40.

WHEN at any time thou art offended with anyone's impudence, put presently this question to thyself: What? Is it then possible, that there should not be any impudent men in the world! Certainly it is not possible. Desire not then that which is impossible. For this one (thou must think), whosoever he be, is one of those impudent ones, that the world cannot be without. So of the subtle and crafty, so of the perfidious, so of everyone that offendeth, must thou ever be ready to reason with thyself. For whilst in general thou dost thus reason with thyself, that the kind of them must needs be in the world, thou wilt be the better able to use meekness towards every particular. This also thou shalt find of very good use, upon every such occasion, presently to consider with thyself, what proper virtue nature hath furnished man with, against such a vice, or to encounter with a disposition vicious in this kind. As for example, against the unthankful, it hath given goodness and meekness, as an antidote, and so against another vicious in another kind some other peculiar faculty. And generally, is it not in thy power to instruct him better, that is in an error?

MARCUS AURELIUS. MEDITATIONS. Book ix. 43.

Wednesday

August 10

HOW is my brother to lay aside his anger against me?

Bring him to me, and I will tell him; but I have nothing to say to you about his anger.

EPICTETUS. DISCOURSES. Book i. §15. ¶1.

AFTER this, know likewise, that you are a brother; and that to this character it belongs, to make concessions; to be easily persuaded: to use gentle language; never to claim for yourself any of the things dependent on choice, but cheerfully to give these, that you may have the larger share of what is dependent on it. For consider what it is, instead of a lettuce, for instance, or a chair, to procure for yourself a good temper? How great an advantage gained!

EPICTETUS. DISCOURSES. Book ii. §10. ¶3.

Tuesday

August 9

SOME are peevish and fastidious, and say, I cannot dine with such a fellow, to be obliged to hear him all day recounting how he fought in Mysia. "I told you, my friend, how I gained the eminence. There I am besieged again." But another says, "I had rather get a dinner, and hear him prate as much as he pleases."

Do you compare the value of these things, and judge for yourself; but do not let it be with depression and anxiety, and with a supposition that you are unhappy, for no one compels you to go.

EPICTETUS. DISCOURSES. Book i. §25. ¶3.

RECEIVE temporal blessings without ostentation, when they are sent; and thou shalt be able to part with them with all readiness and facility when they are taken from thee again.

MARCUS AURELIUS. MEDITATIONS. Book iii. 31.

Monday

August 8

EPICTETUS being asked how a person might grieve his enemy, answered, "By doing as well as possible himself."

EPICTETUS. FRAGMENTS. 125.

HE that is unjust, is also impious. For the Nature of the Universe, having made all reasonable creatures one for another, to the end that they should do one another good ; more or less according to the several persons and occasions ; but in no wise hurt one another : it is manifest that he that doth transgress against this her will, is guilty of impiety towards the most ancient and venerable of all the Deities.

MARCUS AURELIUS. MEDITATIONS. Book ix. 1.

THOSE things that are his own, and in his own power, he himself takes order for that they be good : and as for those that happen unto him, he believes them to be so.

MARCUS AURELIUS. MEDITATIONS. Book iii. 4.

Sunday

August 7

A WISE and good person neither quarrels with anyone himself nor so far as possible, suffers another. The life of Socrates affords us an example of this too. For he well remembered that no one is master of the ruling faculty of another, and therefore desired nothing but what was his own. " And what is that? " Not that this or that person should be moved conformably to nature, for that belongs to others; but that while they act in their own way as they please, he should nevertheless be affected and live according to nature.

EPICTETUS. DISCOURSES. Book iv. §5. ¶1

THE best kind of revenge is not to become like unto them.

Let this be your only joy, and your only comfort, to pass from one sociable, kind action without intermission unto another, God being ever in thy mind.

MARCUS AURELIUS. MEDITATIONS. Book vi. 5, 6.

IF he has sinned, his is the harm, not mine. But perchance he has not.

MARCUS AURELIUS. MEDITATIONS. Book ix. 37.

Saturday

August 6

TO desire things impossible is the part of a mad man. But it is a thing impossible, that wicked man should not commit some such things. Neither doth anything happen to any man, which in the ordinary course of nature as natural unto him doth not happen. Again, the same things happen unto others also. And truly, if either he that is ignorant that such a thing hath happened unto him, or he that is ambitious to be commended for his magnanimity, can be patient, and is not grieved: is it not a grievous thing, that either ignorance, or a vain desire to please and to be commended, should be more powerful and effectual than true prudence? As for the things themselves, they touch not the soul, neither can they have any access unto it: neither can they of themselves any ways either affect it, or move it.

MARCUS AURELIUS. MEDITATIONS. Book vi. 16.

Friday

August 5

THEY are thieves and pilferers.

What do you mean by thieves and pilferers? They are in an error concerning good and evil. Ought you, then, to be angry, or to pity them? Do but show them their error, and you will see that they will amend their faults; but, if they do not see it, the principles they form are to them their supreme rule.

What, then, ought not this thief and this adulterer to be destroyed?

By no means [ask that]; but say rather, “Ought not he to be destroyed who errs and is deceived in things of the greatest importance; blinded, not in the sight that distinguishes white from black, but in the judgment that distinguishes good from evil?" By stating your question thus you see how inhuman it is, and just as if you would say, "Ought not this blind, or that deaf, man to be destroyed?" For, if the greatest hurt be a deprivation of the most valuable things, and the most valuable thing to every one is a right judgment in choosing; when any one is deprived of this, why, after all, are you angry? You ought not to be affected, man, contrary to nature, by the ills of another. Pity him rather. Do not be angry; nor say, as many do, What! shall these execrable and odious wretches dare to act thus? Whence have you so suddenly learnt wisdom? Because we admire those things which such people take from us. Do not admire your clothes, and you will not be angry with the thief.

EPICTETUS. DISCOURSES. Book iii. §5. ¶2

Thursday

August 4

EITHER teach them better if it be in thy power; or if it be not, remember that for this use, to bear with them patiently, was mildness and goodness granted unto thee. The gods themselves are good unto such; yea and in some things, (as in matter of health, of wealth, of honour), are content often to further their endeavours: so good and gracious are they. And mightest thou not be so too? or, tell me, what doth hinder thee?

MARCUS AURELIUS. MEDITATIONS. Book ix. 9.

HIM that offends, teach with love and meekness, and show him his error. But if thou canst not, then blame thyself, or rather not thyself neither, if thy will and endeavours have not been wanting.

MARCUS AURELIUS. MEDITATIONS. Book x. 4.

Wednesday

August 3

WILL you say, Hath no one any regard for me, a man of letters? Why, you are wicked, and fit for no use. Just as if wasps should take it ill that no one hath any regard for them, but all shun, and whoever can beats them down. You have such a sting, that whoever you strike with it is thrown into troubles and pangs. What would you have us do with you?

EPICTETUS. DISCOURSES. Book ii. §4. ¶1

Tuesday

August 2

WHY is it that they have railed at you ? Because every man hates what hinders him. They would have one actor crowned, you another. They hindered you; and you, them. You proved the stronger. They have done what they could; they have railed at the person who hindered them. What would you have, then? Would you do as you please, and not have them even talk as they please? Where is the wonder of all this? Doth not the husbandman rail at Zeus when he is hindered by him? Doth not the sailor? Do men ever cease railing at Caesar? What then, is Zeus ignorant of this? Are not the things that are said reported to Caesar? How then doth he act? He knows that if he was to punish all railers, he would have nobody left to command.

EPICTETUS. DISCOURSES. Book iii. §5. ¶2

Monday

August 1

IF you go and revile your brother, I tell you you have forgot who you are, and what is your name. For even if you were a smith and made an ill use of the hammer, you would have forgot the smith: and, if you have forgot the brother, and are become, instead of a brother, an enemy do you imagine you have made no change of one thing for another in that case? If, instead of a man, a gentle social creature, you are become a wild beast, mischievous, insidious, biting; have you lost nothing? But must you lose money, in order to suffer damage; and is there no other thing, the loss of which damages a man? If you were to part with your skill in grammar, or in music, would you think the loss of these damage? But if you part with honour, decency, and gentleness, do you think that no matter?

EPICTETUS. DISCOURSES. Book ii. §10. ¶4